



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

OPNAVINST 5711.96B
N311

16 November 1998

OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5711.96B

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: U.S./USSR INCIDENTS AT SEA AND DANGEROUS MILITARY
ACTIVITIES AGREEMENTS

Ref: (a) DMA Pub 102, International Code of Signals
(b) CJCSI 2311.01, Implementation Procedures for the
Agreement Between the United States and Russia on the
Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (NOTAL)
(c) Flight Information Handbook, Interception Signals ICAO
Standard (NOTAL)
(d) OPNAVINST 3100.6G, Special Incident Reporting (OPREP-
3, Navy Blue and Unit Sitrep) Procedures (NOTAL)

Encl: (1) Agreement Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On
and Over the Waters Outside the Limits of the
Territorial Sea, as Amended by the 1973 Protocol to the
Agreement and the 1998 Exchange of Diplomatic Notes
(2) Instructions for Use With the Supplementary Signals

1. Purpose

a. To provide information on and to issue procedures
concerning the agreements between the Governments of the U.S. and
the Russian Federation on the prevention of incidents at sea and
dangerous military activities.

b. To issue the Table of Supplementary Signals authorized
for use during communications between U.S. and Russian Federation
units under the Incidents at Sea Agreement.

This instruction has been substantially revised and should be
reviewed in its entirety.

2. Cancellation. OPNAVINST 5711.96A.

3. Background

a. Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement

(1) Prior to the INCSEA Agreement, numerous incidents at
sea involving harassment or interference occurred between units
of the Soviet and United States naval surface and air forces. In

16 November 1998

April 1968, after a series of incidents in the Sea of Japan, the United States invited the Soviet Union to discuss procedures to reduce the number of incidents at sea. The Soviets replied in November 1970 with an invitation to open discussions in Moscow. Following an exploratory round of talks in October 1971, the agreement was concluded in May 1972 in Washington. As a measure of the importance with which this agreement was viewed, it was signed formally on 25 May 1972 in Moscow by the Secretary of the Navy for the United States and the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy for the USSR. In May 1973, during the first annual review, a Protocol to the Agreement was negotiated which extends certain provisions of the agreement to include non-military ships. The actual agreement text, as modified by the 1973 Protocol and an Exchange of Diplomatic Notes in 1998, is included as enclosure (1).

(2) The agreement is operational in nature and is applicable to U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Military Sealift Command (MSC), U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Air Force units when operating on and over waters beyond the territorial sea.

(a) USNS ships are U.S. naval auxiliaries and, therefore, subject to the agreement as specified in Article I. USNS ships do not fly a naval auxiliary flag as Russian auxiliaries do. Rather, such ships are identified by blue and gold stack markings unique to USNS ships.

(b) The remainder of the MSC fleet consists of commercial ships under charter for various lengths of time. These ships bear the usual commercial markings of their owners. They do not bear any markings to indicate their charter to MSC. All commercial, non-military U.S. ships are protected from harassment by Russian naval and naval auxiliary ships and military aircraft under the provisions of the 1973 Protocol to the INCSEA Agreement. The protocol requires the U.S. and Russia to take measures to notify non-military ships concerning provisions of the agreement, and is directed at securing mutual safety. No specific action, however, such as use of special signals, is required of non-military ships.

(c) Submarines are covered by this agreement only when operating on the surface.

(d) On the Russian side, naval and naval auxiliary ships (ships authorized to fly a Russian naval auxiliary flag) are bound by this agreement. This includes Russian AGIs.

16 November 1998

(3) The INCSEA Agreement is intended to:

(a) Reduce the risk of serious, unintended confrontation between U.S. and Russian forces on and over waters outside the limits of the territorial sea.

(b) Promote safety of operations where U.S. and Russian naval and air forces operate in proximity to each other.

(4) The INCSEA Agreement is consistent with and, in fact, requires compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (Rules of the Road). The agreement recognizes that surveillance activities are not fully accounted for by the Rules of the Road and prescribes guidance in these situations. The agreement also provides guidance in aircraft-to-ship and aircraft-to-aircraft situations for which there are no internationally recognized rules of conduct.

b. Dangerous Military Activities (DMA) Agreement

(1) The 1972 INCSEA Agreement has provided procedures and a forum for discussion which has greatly reduced friction between the U.S. and Soviet/Russian Navies. During 1987 discussions to increase U.S.-USSR military-to-military contacts, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Admiral Crowe advanced the idea of establishing a high level forum similar to the Incidents at Sea forum to meet regularly and discuss ways of avoiding dangerous military confrontations over land and territorial waters. This idea was turned over to a joint U.S./Soviet working group to analyze and propose actions to prevent dangerous military activities. Between October 1988 and May 1989 the joint military working group met six times, identifying specific situations where U.S. and Soviet military forces might interact with a potential for harm to personnel or damage to equipment, and negotiating a draft agreement using the 1972 INCSEA Agreement as a model. The U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Soviet General Staff signed the DMA Agreement in Moscow on 12 June 1989, to enter into force on 1 January 1990.

(2) The agreement is operational in nature and is applicable to the armed forces of the U.S. when operating in proximity to units of the Russian armed forces. Naval forces covered by this agreement include military aircraft and the ships and auxiliaries discussed in paragraphs 3a(2)(a) through 3a(2)(d).

16 November 1998

(3) The DMA Agreement is intended to:

(a) Reduce the risk of serious, unintended confrontation between U.S. and Russian forces by preventing the specific dangerous military activities defined in the DMA Agreement.

(b) Resolve expeditiously and peacefully any incident between U.S. and Russian forces arising as a result of dangerous military activities.

(c) Promote safety of operations where U.S. and Russian armed forces operate in proximity to each other during peacetime.

c. Table of Supplementary Signals

(1) Use of the International Code of Signals (ICS) (reference (a)), adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1965, and the Table of Supplementary Signals (enclosure (2)), a local U.S.-USSR code adopted in 1974, is authorized for communications between U.S. and Russian units as a result of the INCSEA and DMA Agreements.

(2) Additional signals and phrases have been developed, along with communications radio frequencies and call signs, for use under the DMA Agreement.

4. Discussion

a. INCSEA Agreement

(1) The Agreement extends to military and non-military ships and aircraft. U.S. commands should comply strictly with the INCSEA Agreement in both letter and "spirit." Aircraft should maintain a safe distance from Russian ships and aircraft, and especially from ships conducting air operations so as not to present a hazard. Any naval or air unit assigned a mission requiring maneuvers in close proximity with Russian naval or air units must do so with due regard for the provisions of the Incidents at Sea Agreement.

(2) The actions listed below are prohibited by the Agreement:

(a) simulating attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes or other weapons in the direction of Russian ships and aircraft.

16 November 1998

(b) launching objects or firing signal flares in the direction of Russian ships and aircraft so as to pose a danger, constitute a hazard, or interfere with navigation and flight.

(c) using searchlights or other powerful illumination devices to illuminate the navigation bridges of Russian ships or the cockpits of Russian aircraft.

(d) using lasers in such a manner so as to cause injury to personnel or damage to equipment aboard Russian ships or aircraft.

(e) intentionally interfering with communication systems of Russian ships or aircraft.

(3) The INCSEA Agreement applies to U.S. armed forces on and over waters beyond the territorial sea even when under the control of multinational organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

b. DMA Agreement

(1) Reference (b) is the implementation instructions for the Agreement between the United States and Russia on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. The DMA Agreement addresses four specific dangerous military activities which could occur when U.S. and Russian armed forces are operating in the proximity of one another:

(a) Unintentional or distress (force majeure) entry into the national territory of the other party.

(b) Use of lasers in a manner hazardous to the other party.

(c) Hampering operations in a manner hazardous to the other party in a "Special Caution Area."

(d) Interference with command and control networks in a manner hazardous to the other party.

(2) The DMA Agreement applies to U.S. armed forces even when under the control of multinational organizations such as NATO.

(3) The DMA Agreement applies to only U.S. and Russian armed forces. In case of an incident occurring on or over the territory of an ally, each side has reserved the right to consult with its ally concerning measures to be taken.

16 November 1998

(4) The DMA Agreement does not affect the rights and obligations of either side under other international agreements or arrangements in force between the U.S. and Russia, such as the INCSEA Agreement. The DMA Agreement does not affect the right to individual or collective self-defense, the right of assistance entry, or the rights of navigation and overflight in accordance with international law.

5. Action

a. Chief of Naval Operations

(1) Ensure that requirements which may result in close proximity between U.S. naval forces and Russian naval and air units are as explicit as possible, so as to permit operations within the intent and purpose of the INCSEA and DMA Agreements.

(2) Analyze reports of INCSEA and DMA incidents and provide guidance as necessary in cases of possible violations of the agreements by U.S. units.

(3) Forward reports of alleged U.S. violations to the appropriate Fleet Commander in Chief.

(4) When appropriate, discuss alleged INCSEA incidents with the Russian Navy using a Navy-to-Navy communication channel.

(5) Designate a representative to the Joint Military Commission that addresses DMA.

b. Fleet Commanders in Chief

(1) Ensure units are familiar with the provisions of the INCSEA and DMA Agreements and the procedures for their implementation. Deployed units should have this instruction and reference (b) readily accessible.

(2) Require strict compliance with the INCSEA and DMA Agreements in both letter and "spirit."

(3) Issue guidance concerning adherence to the INCSEA and DMA Agreements for operations involving close proximity to Russian units and Russian territory, e.g. surveillance missions.

(4) Ensure units are properly prepared to report and document encounters with Russian units.

16 November 1998

(5) Ensure potential INCSEA incidents are reported by message per paragraph 8, including:

(a) Initial Report by OPREP-3.

(b) Amplifying reports, including initial evaluation by Fleet Commander in Chief.

(c) Detailed written reports with supporting documentation within 15 days, including follow-up evaluation by Fleet Commander in Chief.

(d) When notified of a Russian allegation of a U.S. violation, obtain reports from involved units and prepare a detailed evaluation for submittal to the Chief of Naval Operations.

(6) Ensure DMA incidents are reported per reference (b).

(7) Retain documentation on encounters with Russian units until the results of the INCSEA review covering the time period of the incident are received.

(8) Submit recommendations for improvement of enclosure (2), and this instruction to the Chief of Naval Operations (Attention N3/N5).

6. Procedures

a. Incidents at Sea

(1) When operating in the proximity of Russian ships or aircraft, commanding officers and aircraft commanders shall, to the maximum degree possible, use the appropriate signals from references (a) through (c) and enclosure (2) to indicate maneuvering intentions to Russian commanding officers. At night, in conditions of reduced visibility, or under conditions of lighting and distance when signal flags are not distinct, flashing light, supplemented by radio communications, should be used to pass appropriate signals between U.S. and Russian units. Communication between military aircraft or between ships and military aircraft of the sides will utilize radio communication procedures set forth in enclosure (2) and reference (b). Communication between ships may also use the radio communication procedures of enclosure (2) and reference (b). In order to establish communications, use the call signs "U.S. WARSHIP," "RUSSIAN WARSHIP," "U.S. AIRCRAFT," and "RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT" instead of the call signs contained in reference (b). Commanders of ships and military aircraft should use appropriate signals

OPNAVINST 5711.96B
16 November 1998

from enclosure (2) when they are to communicate information or action which may constitute dangers for ships and military aircraft of the sides. To ensure ship and aircraft safety, clear voice radio communications in English may also be used.

(2) Incidents evaluated as potentially violating the letter or "spirit" of the INCSEA Agreement must be reported promptly by message per reference (d) or procedures specified by Fleet Commanders in Chief.

(3) Message reports may be used by CNO to discuss an INCSEA incident with the Russian Naval Attache shortly after it occurs. Messages amplifying or evaluating the report of an INCSEA incident should not be delayed while collecting supplemental information and documentation for the detailed written report. The message reports should, however, provide sufficient detail (e.g., signals exchanged, position, course, speed, bearing, and range information on the units involved) to support timely discussions with the Russian Naval Attache. These exchanges are not diplomatic protests, and should not be characterized as such. If a diplomatic protest is appropriate, diplomatic channels are used. Detailed written reports, for both alleged Russian and U.S. violations of the INCSEA Agreement, serve as the basis for detailed discussions at the INCSEA review with the Russians.

b. Dangerous Military Activities. Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands and of United States Elements of multinational commands are responsible for providing authoritative direction regarding all aspects of the DMA Agreement. Those procedures will be derived from reference (b). Any conflict between those requirements and the requirements of this instruction should be brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations (N3/N5).

7. Classification Guidance. Details of an incident or event between U.S. or Russian units do not merit classification unless operational aspects surrounding the incident require classification for national security reasons.

8. Action

a. In general, OPREP-3 NAVY BLUE series messages from reference (d) are appropriate for reporting INCSEA incidents, except in cases of national level interest, when OPREP-3 PINNACLE series messages should be used. Amplifying message reports should follow as soon as information is available. Detailed written reports should be submitted within 15 working days via operational chain of command to Chief of Naval Operations (Attn:

16 November 1998

N3/N5) with advance copy to CNO. When notified of a Russian allegation of a U.S. violation, appropriate reports are required from the units involved.

b. DMA incidents should be reported per reference (b).

c. Incidents involving hazardous use of laser/directed energy devices require multiple reports: OPREP-3 series message per reference (d) for primary reporting of the incident in INCSEA and reference (b) for additional reporting in DMA channels.

d. The following documentation has proven effective in presenting the U.S. view of an INCSEA incident, and should be forwarded with the detailed written report. Similar information should be provided in the detailed report required for DMA incidents:

(1) A written chronology of events. Include signals used during the incident and whether or not both sides acknowledged signals. Provide appropriate position, course, speed, bearing and range data. A voice cassette narrative recording is an effective tool for use in constructing an accurate chronology.

(2) Narrated videotape, motion pictures, and/or sequence of photographs. Videotapes which present an interaction clearly are by far the most convincing evidence of a violation. A portion of the reporting ship/aircraft in foreground is desired to provide perspective. Pictures taken for intelligence purposes (i.e., close-ups) are of limited value, but are desired to supplement other visual documentation that presents the overall perspective. Indication of ship's wake can be effective in showing history for hazardous maneuvering situations. In order for a report of a gun-training incident to be effective, videotape or a series of photographs which document weapons movement and relative motion of own unit is considered necessary to substantiate a violation. Visual documentation of flashing light sequences, flaghoists, hull numbers or names of ships is also desired. Annotate documents as necessary to permit correlation with geographic reconstruction and chronology (e.g. time taken and location of the camera for pictures).


(3) A Geographic Reconstruction. Ensure sufficient history is presented to answer probable questions. Multiple charts may be required for complex hazardous maneuvering incidents (ship-to-ship, air-to-ship, air-to-air).

(4) Clarifying comments. For example, disparities that exist with previously submitted reports should be resolved.

OPNAVINST 5711.96B

16 November 1998

9. Reports. The reports required by this instruction are exempt from reports control by SECNAVINST 5214.2B.


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OPNAVINST 5711.96B
16 November 1998

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON THE PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS
ON AND OVER WATERS OUTSIDE THE LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA, AS
AMENDED BY THE 1973 PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT AND THE 1998
EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC NOTES

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein referred to as the Parties;

Desiring to assure the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces on waters beyond the limits of the territorial sea, and flight of their military aircraft over waters outside the limits of the territorial sea, and

Guided by the principles and rules of international law, and recognizing that the objectives of the Agreement may be furthered by additional understandings, in particular concerning actions of naval ships and military aircraft with respect to non-military ships of each Party,

Have decided to conclude this Agreement and have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

For the purposes of this Agreement, the following definitions shall apply:

1. "Ship" means:

(a) A warship belonging to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or to the Armed Forces of the United States of America bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the respective Party and whose name appears in

Enclosure (1)

16 November 1998

the appropriate service list or an equivalent document and is manned by a crew subject to regular military discipline.

(b) An auxiliary vessel belonging to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or the Armed Forces of the United States of America authorized to fly the naval auxiliary flag where such a flag has been established by the respective party.

2. "Aircraft" means all military manned heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air craft, excluding spacecraft.

3. "Formation" means an ordered arrangement of two or more ships proceeding together and normally maneuvered together.

4. "Non-naval vessel" shall mean all vessels not included in Paragraph 1 of this Article.

5. "Non-naval aircraft" shall mean all flying craft not included in paragraph 2 of this Article, except for spacecraft.

ARTICLE II

The Parties shall take measures to ensure strict compliance by the commanders of their ships with the letter and spirit of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea adopted in 1972, (COLREGS-72).

The Parties also recognize that the basis of freedom of navigation and flights outside the limits of territorial waters is the principles and norms recognized by international law and reflected, in particular, in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

ARTICLE III

1. In all cases ships operating in proximity to each other, except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, shall remain well clear to avoid risk of collision.

16 November 1998

2. Ships meeting or operating in the vicinity of a formation of the other Party shall, while conforming to the Rules of the Road, avoid maneuvering in a manner which would hinder the evolutions of the formation.

3. Formations shall not conduct maneuvers through areas of heavy traffic where internationally recognized traffic separation schemes are in effect.

4. Ships engaged in surveillance of other ships shall stay at a distance which avoids the risk of collision and also shall avoid executing maneuvers embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance. Except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, a surveillant shall take positive early action so as, in the exercise of good seamanship, not to embarrass or endanger ships under surveillance.

5. When ships of both Parties maneuver in sight of one another, such signals (flag, sound, and light) as are prescribed by the Rules of the Road, the International Code of Signals, or other mutually agreed signals shall be adhered to for signaling operations and intentions.

6. Ships of the Parties shall not:

- simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons in the direction of the other Party's ships or aircraft;

- eject any objects or launch signal rockets in the direction of the other Party's ships and aircraft in such a manner as to possibly endanger these ships or aircraft or hamper navigation or flights;

- use searchlights or other powerful illumination devices to illuminate the navigation bridges of ships or the cabins of aircraft in flight of the other Party;

- use lasers in such a manner as to possibly impair the health of crew members or damage the equipment aboard a ship or aircraft of the other Party;

16 November 1998

deliberately interfere with the communications systems of the other Party.

Nor shall the ships of the Parties take such actions against non-naval vessels and non-military aircraft of the other Party.

7. When conducting exercises with submerged submarines, exercising ships shall show the appropriate signals prescribed by the International Code of Signals to warn ships of the presence of submarines in the area.

8. Ships of one Party when approaching ships of the other Party conducting operations as set forth in Rule 4(c) of the Rules of the Road, and particularly ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft as well as ships engaged in replenishment underway, shall take appropriate measures not to hinder maneuvers of such ships and shall remain well clear.

ARTICLE IV

The commanders of aircraft of each of the Parties shall exercise maximum caution and prudence in approaching the other Party's vessels and aircraft, especially vessels engaged in launching or landing aircraft, and in the interest of mutual safety shall not:

- simulate attacks or the use of weapons against the other Party's ships and aircraft;

- drop any objects or launch signal rockets in the direction of the other Party's ships and aircraft in such a manner as to possibly endanger these ships or aircraft or hamper the navigation or flights;

- direct searchlights or other powerful illumination devices toward the other Party's vessels and aircraft;

- perform aerobatics above the ships and or in the immediate vicinity of aircraft of the other party;

16 November 1998

use lasers in such a manner as to possibly impair the health of crew members or damage equipment aboard a ship or aircraft of the other Party;

deliberately interfere with the communications systems of the other Party's ships and aircraft.

Nor shall the ships of the Parties take such actions against non-naval vessels and non-military aircraft of the other Party.

ARTICLE V

1. Ships of the Parties operating in sight of one another shall raise proper signals concerning their intent to begin launching or landing aircraft.

2. Aircraft of the Parties flying over the waters outside the limits of the territorial sea in darkness or under instrument conditions shall, whenever feasible, display navigation lights.

ARTICLE VI

Both Parties shall:

1. Provide through the established system of radio broadcasts of information and warning to mariners, not less than 3 to 5 days in advance as a rule, notification of actions on the high seas which represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight.

2. Make increased use of the informative signals contained in the International Code of Signals to signify the intentions of their respective ships when maneuvering in proximity to one another. At night, or in conditions of reduced visibility, or under conditions of lighting and such distances when signal flags are not distinct, flashing light should be used to inform ships of maneuvers which may hinder the movements of others or involve a risk of collision.

16 November 1998

3. Utilize on a trial basis signals additional to those in the International Code of Signals, submitting such signals to the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization for its consideration and for the information of other States.

4. Take necessary measures to ensure that the commanders of ships and aircraft of each of the Parties exercise maximum caution in areas where the activities of the other Party's ships and aircraft have been reported to them in accordance with Paragraph 1 of the Article, and that they refrain as much as possible from interfering with these activities.

5. Take measures to notify the non-naval ships and non-military aircraft of each of the Parties of the provisions of the 1972 Agreement that are directed at ensuring mutual safety.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties shall exchange appropriate information concerning instances of collision, incidents which result in damage, or other incidents at sea between ships and aircraft of the Parties. The United States Navy shall provide such information through the Soviet Naval Attaché in Washington and the Soviet Navy shall provide such information through the United States Naval Attaché in Moscow.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for a period of three years. It will thereafter be renewed without further action by the Parties for successive periods of three years each.

This agreement may be terminated by either Party upon six months written notice to the other Party.

ARTICLE IX

The Parties shall meet within one year after the date of the signing of this Agreement to review the implementation of its terms. Similar consultations shall be held thereafter annually, or more frequently as the Parties may decide.

ARTICLE X

The Parties shall designate members to form a Committee which will consider specific measures in conformity with this Agreement. The Committee will, as a particular part of its work, consider the practical workability of concrete fixed distances to be observed in encounters between ships, aircraft, and ships and aircraft. The Committee will meet within six months of the date of signature of this Agreement and submit its recommendations for decision by the Parties during the consultations prescribed in Article IX.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE WITH THE SUPPLEMENTARY SIGNALS

I. General

1. The signals in the attached table supplement those in the International Code of Signals (ICS), issued by reference (a).

2. Although these supplementary signals are also entered in reference (a) as appendix 6, the signals in the attached table are considered to be a local code for use between U.S. and Russian units and are not part of the ICS.

3. In situations where units of a third country are present, these supplementary signals may still be used unless the potential for confusing the third country outweighs the advantage of communicating with the Russian unit(s).

4. Since North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other allies are aware of the arrangement between the U.S. and Russia for use of these supplementary signals, these signals may also be used when U.S. units are operating within a NATO formation, or in other allied formations.

5. As a result of bilateral INCSEA agreements with Russia, signals like those in the attached table may also be used by allied navies when their units encounter Russian units. There are, however, no assurances that each country's INCSEA signals table is identical to the U.S.-Russia agreed signals.

II. Use

1. The general instructions for use of the ICS apply to the use of the supplementary signals as amplified below.

2. The "CODE" or answering pennant is not used with signals from the table of supplementary signals. Use of the code or answering pennant with the ICS signals is specified in reference (a), chapter 1, section 5, paragraphs 3, 4, and 8.

OPNAVINST 5711.96B
16 November 1998

3. The signal "YV1" - which means "The groups that follow are from the local code" - should precede the supplementary signals in order to avoid misunderstanding as to the source of the signal code (i.e., Table of Supplementary Signals vice ICS).

4. The supplementary signals may be communicated by the same methods used when signaling with the ICS, i.e., flag hoist, flashing light, voice, Morse, or hand (semaphore) flags.

5. The following guidelines apply when using radio communications to pass supplementary signals under the INCSEA Agreement:

a. Use radio communications as backup for flag hoist or flashing light when limited visibility exists, or when in extremis and danger of collision or other hazard is imminent (i.e., time is essential and use of all means of communication is prudent).

b. For ship to ship communications, use bridge-to-bridge VHF radio channel 16 (156.8 MHz) or HF band frequency 2182.0 KHz. For communications with or between aircraft, use VHF band frequency 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz; after initial contact is made, the working frequency 130 MHz or 278.0 MHz may be used. In order to establish these communications, use the call signs "U.S. WARSHIP", "RUSSIAN WARSHIP", "U.S. AIRCRAFT", and "RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT" instead of the call signs contained in appendix (a) to enclosure (b) of reference (b).

c. Use of radio communications procedures established for use with the ICS, including the use of international phonetic English letters and numbers.

d. Use the signal "YANKEE VICTOR ONE" (The groups that follow are from the local code) preceding each supplementary signal.

e. The following selected supplementary signals may be used during radio communications between military aircraft or

16 November 1998

ships and military aircraft: PP8, RT7, RT8, UY1, UY2, UY3, UY4, UY9, UY10, UY12, ZL1, ZL2, and ZL3. These signals are noted in the Table of Signals by a pound sign (#). These signals are intended for transmission to aircraft over voice circuits since it is extremely difficult for aircraft to identify and understand flag signals.

f. To ensure ship and aircraft safety, clear voice radio communications in English may also be used.

EXAMPLE:

Situation: U.S. Warship intends to conduct a gunnery exercise to the east. Russian aircraft is in the area.

Call up:

Russian Aircraft, Russian Aircraft, Russian Aircraft delta echo U.S. Warship

Response:

U.S. Warship, U.S. Warship, U.S. Warship delta echo Russian Aircraft

After comms established:

Russian Aircraft delta echo U.S. Warship UNIFORM YANKEE
THREE TACK TWO

Russian aircraft acknowledges:

U.S. Warship delta echo Russian Aircraft ZULU LIMA ONE

6. The following guidelines apply when using radio communications to pass supplementary signals under the DMA Agreement:

a. Use bridge-to-bridge VHF radio channel 16 (156.8 MHz) or other communication equipment and frequencies specified in reference (d)

b. Use the radio communications procedures established for use with the ICS, including the use of international phonetic

16 November 1998

English letters and numbers, supplemented by call signs and phrases in reference (d).

c. Use of the signal "YANKEE VICTOR ONE" (The groups that follow are from the local code) preceding each supplementary signal.

7. Certain supplementary signals require an amplification to indicate distance, course or time. Since the meaning of each supplementary signal is precise, and in order to avoid confusion, the amplifying section should not be preceded by the signal code designators "R" (distance); "C" (course); "T" (time).

EXAMPLES:

"RT9 - 6" means "I shall cross astern at a distance of 600 meters."

"UY1 - 120" means "I am preparing to launch/recover aircraft on true course 120."

"RU2 - 5" means "I am beginning a port turn in approximately 5 minutes."

8. Certain supplementary signals may be amplified to show a direction of danger indicated with respect to the signaler. The direction is indicated using directional compliments listed in the ICS (reference (a), chapter 2, section 10, table 3).

EXAMPLES:

"UY3 - 2" means "I am preparing to conduct gunnery exercises. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated ... East."

"NB1 - 8" means "I have my unattached hydrographic survey equipment bearing in a direction from me as indicated ... North."

OPNAVINST 5711.96B

16 November 1998

9. In order to reduce the opportunity for confusion, receipt of supplementary signals should be acknowledged by using "ZL1" from the supplementary table or, if not understood, by "ZL3" from the supplementary table, rather than "ZL" or "ZQ" from the ICS.

Table of Signals

<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
IR1	I am engaged in oceanographic operations.
IR2(...)	I am streaming/towing hydrographic survey equipment _____ meters astern.
IR3	I am recovering hydrographic survey equipment.
IR4	I am conducting salvage operations.
JH1	I am attempting to retract a grounded vessel.
MH1	Request you not cross my course ahead of me.
NB1(...)	I have my unattached hydrographic survey equipment bearing in a direction from me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS).
PJ1	I am unable to alter course to my starboard.
PJ2	I am unable to alter course to port.
PJ3	Caution, I have a steering casualty.
PP8(...)#	Dangerous operations in progress. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS)
QF1	Caution, I have stopped my engines.
QS6(...)	I am proceeding on course _____.
QV2	I am in a fixed multiple leg moor using two or more anchors or buoys fore and aft. Request you remain

clear.

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16 November 1998

SIGNAL MEANING

QV3	I am anchored in deep water with hydrographic survey equipment streamed
RT2	I intend to pass you on your port side.
RT3	I intend to pass you on your starboard side.
RT4	I will overtake you on your port side.
RT5	I will overtake you on your starboard side.
RT6(...)	I am/formation is maneuvering. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS).
RT7(...)#	I shall approach your ship on starboard side to a distance of _____ 100's of meters (yards).
RT8(...)#	I shall approach your ship on port side to a distance of _____ 100's of meters (yards).
RT9(...)	I shall cross astern at a distance of _____ 100's of meters (yards).
RU2(...)	I am beginning a port turn in approximately _____ minutes.
RU3(...)	I am beginning a starboard turn in approximately _____ minutes.
RU4	The formation is preparing to alter course to port.
RU5	The formation is preparing to alter course to starboard.

OPNAVINST 5711.96B

16 November 1998

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16 November 1998

SIGNAL MEANING

RU6	I am engaged in maneuvering exercises. It is dangerous to be inside the formation.
RU7	I am preparing to submerge.
RU8	A submarine will surface within two miles of me within 30 minutes. Request you remain clear.
SL2	Request your course, speed and passing intention.
TX1	I am engaged in fisheries patrol.
UY1(...)#	I am preparing to launch/recover aircraft on course _____.
UY2(...)#	I am preparing to conduct missile exercises. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS).
UY3(...)#	I am preparing to conduct gunnery exercises. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS).
UY4 #	I am preparing to conduct/am conducting operations employing explosive charges.
UY5(...)	I am maneuvering in preparation for torpedo launching exercises. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS).
UY6(...)	I am preparing to conduct/am conducting underway replenishment on course _____ (Table 3 of ICS).

OPNAVINST 5711.96B
16 November 1998

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OPNAVINST 5711.96B
16 November 1998

SIGNAL MEANING

UY7(...)	I am preparing to conduct extensive small boat and ship to shore amphibious training operations. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS).
UY8(...)	I am maneuvering to launch/recover amphibious landing craft/boats. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS).
UY9 #	I am preparing to conduct/am conducting helicopter operations over my stern.
UY10 *#	I am testing my gun systems.
UY11 *	I am testing my missile systems.
UY12(...)#	I am preparing to conduct/am conducting gunnery (bombing) exercises from aircraft on a towed target. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction of me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS).
ZL1 #	I have received and understood your signal.
ZL2 #	Do you understand? Request acknowledgment.
ZL3 #	Your signal has been received but not understood.

* Compliance with Article III, paragraph 6 of the U.S./USSR Incidents at Sea Agreement (i.e., do not train armament at Russian ships and aircraft) is required while conducting gun or missile system checks.

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